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Recent work in biology and cognitive science depicts a variety of target phenomena 
as the products of a tangled web of causal influences. Such influences may include both 
internal and external factors, as well as complex patterns of reciprocal causal interaction. 
Such twisted ales are sometimes seen as a threat to explanatory strategies that invoke 
notions such as "inner programs", "genes for" and sometimes even "internal 
representations". But the threat, I shall argue, is more apparent than real. Complex causal 
influence, in and of itself, provides no good reason to reject these familiar explanatory 
notions. To believe otherwise, I suggest, is generally to commit (at least) one of two 
seductive errors. The first error is tot think that the general notion of a state x coding for an 
outcome y involves the state's constituting a full description of y. This is what I call the 
"myth of self-contained code". The second error is to think that the practice of treating 
certain factors as special (e.g., seeing genes as coding for outcomes in a way environmental 
factors do not) depends on the (often mistaken) belief that the singles out factor is somehow 
doing the most real work. Where the work load is evenly spread, it is assumed there can be 
no reason to treat one factor in a special way. This is what I term the "Myth of Explanatory 
Symmetry." Avoiding these errors involves reminding ourselves of 1) the context-
dependence of even standard, unproblematic uses if the notions of code, program and 
information-content, and 2) the difference between explaining why an event occurred and 
displaying the full workings of a complex causal system. 
1. Introduction: Complexity and Explanation 
Recent work in biology1, cognitive science2 (as well as economics3, cognitive 
anthropology4, and philosophy5) displays an increasing sensitivity to what might be termed 
the problem of complex causation. Complex causation obtains when some phenomenon 
n of interest looks to depend on a much wider and more tangled web of causal influences 




is certainly the case that we can discover that, in a given instance (say, the explanation of 
mature form in certain biological organisms) the relevant causal web is much broader and 
more multi-factored than it once appeared. Such a web (we shall see examples in Section 2) 
may actively involve both internal factors (such as genetic influences), external factors 
(such as environmental influences and basic laws of form), and extended processes of 
reciprocal interaction in which some factors xxx and are modified by the action of the 
others6. 
Complex causal webs have, of late, figured in a number of arguments designed to put 
pressure on familiar explanatory constructs. Target constructs include the notions of "inner 
programs", "genes for" and "internal representations". Thus Thelen & Smith (1994) argue 
that action and cognition are not to be explained by reference to genetic blueprints or 
programs, because they are emergent out of the interactions of multiple forces spanning 
brain, body and world. As a result "there is order, direction, and structure ... but there is no 
design [nor] program in the genes" (op.cit., p.xix). Elman et al. (1996) argue, for similar 
reasons that "it is more useful to view genes as catalysts rather than codes or programs" 
(op.cit., p. 351), and go on to promote a multi-factor, highly interactionist view as an 
alternative to the widespread idea that we are born with innate knowledge concerning 
grammar, physics, theory of mind, and so on (op.cit., p. 357-396). Perhaps most 
ambitiously of all, the multiple and complex interactive relations that characterize real-
world, real-time activity have been seen by some as threatening the spread to internal 
programs and computations in the cognitive scientific explanation of action. The leading 
idea here is that "the relation between nervous system and environment is one of influence 
of dynamics rather than specification of state" (Wheeler (1994)) may afflict the inner 
organization itself to the extent that it becomes fruitless or impossible to try to see "the 




p. 40). Traditional explanatory models, according to these arguments, underrate the extent 
to which action is structures by the continuous interplay of multiple (inner and outer) 
forces. Hence the appeal, to many theorists, of the dynamical systems perspective which 
depict "complexes of parts or aspects..all evolving in a continuous, simultaneous and 
mutually determining fashion" (van Gelder & Port (1996), p. 13). 
There is much that is true and important in all these claims and arguments. Some of 
the detailed disputes I comment upon elsewhere -- see, e.g., Clark (1997b) and Clark (to 
appear). The present focus, however, is much more narrow. I shall examine just one aspect 
of the arguments viz the (putative) tension between explanations that speak of "genes for," 
"programs for," "codes for," and so on, and the fact (assuming it is a fact) that specific 
outcomes depend on a multitude of subtly interacting internal and external factors and 
forces. The appearance of tension, I shall argue, is largely illusory and is fostered by the 
(explicit or tactic) acceptance of one or both of the following myths: 
Myth One: The Self-Contained Code 
If some x is to be properly said to code for, program for, describe or even prescribe 
some outcome y, then x must constitute a detailed description of y, even when x is 
considered independently of its normal ecological backdrop. 
 
Myth Two: Explanatory Symmetry 
If the overall causal web is complex yet x is to be cited as the cause of y, then x must 
be the factor that does the most actual work in bringing it about than y. Causal 
symmetry, by contrast, implies explanatory symmetry. 
Both myths are untrue (that=s why they are myths). But they are pernicious and exert 
a clear (often explicit -- see sections 4 and 5) force on our thought and argument. The 
remedy for the myth is, I think, some reflection on 1) the nature of causal explanation -- in 




causal pathways. And 2) the notion of the practical information-content of a message, code 
or inscription. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section (section 2), I display two 
examples of the kind of causal complexity at issue. Section 3 then canvasses some of the 
more challenging responses to the discovery of such complexity. Sections 4 and 5 questions 
these responses by undermining the twin myths described above. Section 6 is a brief 
conclusion. 
2. Ways of Web-Making 
Here are two examples of the kinds of complex causal webs that might confound the 
unwary explanation-giver. The first is borrowed from Elman et al. (1996) and displays the 
range of factors and interactions involved in a newly hatched chick=s well-known capacity 
rapidly to "lock on" to, or "imprint upon" a mother hen. The second is from Thelen & 
Smith (1994) and involves the development of walking skills in human infants. 
Example I: Imprinting in Chicks. 
Newly hatched chickens rapidly become attached to the first mobile object they see. 
This attachment manifests itself as a tendency to follow and attend to the >imprinted= 
object in preference to all others. In the wild, this process of imprinting leads the chick to 
attach itself to a mother hen. But in the laboratory, the process can be manipulated so that 
the chick imprints upon some other mobile object such as a moving ball or cylinder 
(Johnson (1997), or review in Johnson & Bolhuis (1991)). But how, exactly, does this 
process work? Is it simply that the chick is "pre-wired" so as to fixate upon the first 
conspicuous object it sees? That, to be sure, is a fair description of the outcome. But the 
process itself turns out to involved "interactions at a number of different levels: organism-
environment, brain systems, cellular and molecular" (Elman et al. (1996), p. 324). 
To begin with, the imprinting process seems to involve two quite independent neural 




prefer stimuli that fir the head and neck configuration of a similar-sized bird and mammals 
(Johnson & Horn (1988)). The second (a learning systems called IMHV, for "Intermediate 
and Medial Hyperstriatum Ventrale" and located in that specific region of chick forebrain) 
develops a representation of the highly-attended object that allows the chick to recognize 
the object despite variations in spatial location and orientation (Johnson (1997), Ch.4, 
Elman et al. (1996), Ch.6). The presence of these two distinct contributory neural systems 
is indicated by, for example, lesion studies that show that damage to IMHV impairs 
preferences acquired by learning (as when a chick imprints upon a rotating red box) yet 
does not affect the general predisposition to prefer broadly hen-like stimuli (Johnson & 
Horn (1986), Johnson (1997), p. 110). 
Given a normal ecological backdrop, the Conspec and IMHV systems collectively 
yield a powerful and robust attachment to a single attended hen. But how do they actually 
interact? One simple possibility is that the Conspec system acts as a kind of internal filter 
that selects the training data seen by IMHV. Further investigations, however, have shown 
that such internal filtering is probably not occurring (Johnson & Bolhuis (1991)). Instead, 
the two systems look to be internally non-communicating. The interaction between them 
looks to go via a loop that involves the real-world behavior of the whole chick. Conspec, 
operating in a normal ecological setting, causes the whole organism (the chick) to expose 
itself to a heavy dose of training inputs targeted in a mother hen. IMHV has, in addition, 
certain restrictions on the kinds of thing it can learn about. It requires a mobile stimulus of 
a certain size before it "kicks in”. The combination of Conspec and IMHV, operating 
against a natural ecological backdrop, thus leads the chick (via a loop out into the attending 
behavior of the whole organism) to rapidly and robustly develop a translation-invariant 
representation of a mother hen. 
The learning restrictions of IMHV have been speculatively explored using a 




the focus on mobile stimuli and explain the fluent acquisition of a translation-invariant 
representation (one able to pick out an object despite variations in viewing angle and 
spatial operations). The details need not detain us (they are nicely laid out in Elman et 
al.(1996), p. 327-333, and Johnson (1997), p. 105-107), but involve the combination of 
internal positive feedback loops and Hebbian learning. The positive feedback loops caused 
some units active for an object in position P1 to remain active as the object moved into P2, 
P3, etc. The associative learning then allows the development of top-level units that 
respond to the object (the co-occurring set of features) in whatever spatial location it 
appears. The system thus develops location-invariant object detectors. In real chicks, this 
learning process is linked to the expression of a particular gene (c-fos -- see McCabe & 
Horn (1994)), and is thus revealed as itself dependent upon a variety of molecular level 
interactions. 
As a final not if complexity, the Conspec system that forms the other half of the take 
is not, in fact, active at birth. Instead, it depends on details of early motor activity. To 
become active, the Conspec system requires the chick to run about freely at least a small 
period of time between the ages of 12 and 36 hours. Deprived of such motor activity, 
Conspec lies dormant and the learning system operates alone, without the benefit of the 
behavior-based input selection mechanism7. 
Summary: Chick imprinting involves the subtle interplay of such diverse factors as: 
the statistical regularities in the chicks visual experience; the presence of motor activity 
triggering Conspec; the organism-level behavioral effects of Conspec in operation: the 
genetic bases of IMHV and Conspec; and the nature of the ecologically normally hatching 
environment (see Johnson (1997), p. 116, Elman et al. (1996), p. 332). The simple 
phenomenon of filial imprinting in chicks thus turns on a twisted tale in which "multiple 




environment, etc.) Ensure a particular outcome: a spatially invariant representation of the 
mother hen” (op.cit., p. 332). 
Example II: Learning to Walk. 
(Here I shall be brief, as I address this case in greater detail elsewhere8). Consider the 
process of learning to walk. This process, in human infants, now looks to involve a 
complex series of interactions between neural states, the spring-like properties of leg 
muscles and local environmental factors. This vision (of >soft assembly= -- Thelen & 
Smith (1994), p. 60) is contrasted with the image of learning to walk as the temporally 
staged expression of a prior set of instructions encoded in e.g., a genetically specified 
central pattern generator or neural control system (Thelen & Smith (1994)), p. 8-20, 263-
266). In place of a single, privileged, inner-or-genetic cause, Thelen & Smith display a 
multi-dimensional interaction process in which "the organic components and the context 
are equally causal and privileged" (op.cit., p 17). 
Evidence of the multi-factor view comes from a variety of striking experiments in 
which (to give just a few examples): 
C stepping motions are induced in Anon-stepping” infants by holding the baby 
upright in warm water 
C non-stepping seven month olds help upright upon a motorized treadmill 
perform coordinated alternating stepping motions (even compensating for twin belts 
driving each leg at different speeds!) 
Such results (see Thelen & Smith (1994), Ch.1 and 4) show that stepping is not under 
the control of a simple inner variable. Bodily parameters (such as leg weight, which is 
effectively manipulated by partial immersion in water) and environment factors (such as 
the presence of the treadmill) are also playing a role. In the case of the treadmill, further 
experiments revealed that the crucial factor was the orientation of leg and foot to the 




those that made only toe-contact failed to step. Thelen & Smith (op.cit., p. 111-112) 
hypothesize that the infant leg, when stretched out is acting like a spring. At full back 
stretch, the spring up coils and swings the leg forward. Flat-foot belt contact may 
precociously ensure this full back-stretch and hence initiate stepping. Relative flexor or 
extensor tendencies in the legs thus contribute heavily to the emergence of coordinated 
stepping (op.cit., p. 113). 
Summary: Infant stepping behavior depends upon the precise balance of interplay of 
a variety of factors including: the weight of the legs; the "relative flexor (very tight) or 
extensor (more loose) tendencies of the legs" (op.cit., p. 113); and whatever central neural 
structures are implicated in the motor control process itself. Stepping behavior thus 
"emerges only when the central elements cooperate with the effectors -- the muscles, joints, 
tendons -- in the appropriate physical context" (op.cit., p. 113).   
3. Webware (Seeds, Catalysts, Modifiers, and Control Parameters) 
What kinds of explanatory story should we tell to make best sense of cases involving 
complex and heterogeneous causal webs? One widespread negative response goes like this: 
whatever stories we tell, they must not involve the isolation of "privileged elements," or 
give Aontological priority” to any particular strands in the web (see e.g., Thelen & Smith 
(1994), p. 17, 580; Elman et al. (1996), Ch.6, van Gelder & Port (1995), p. 13. For the same 
claims made in a more purely genetic context, see also Kelso (1995), p. 183, Goodwin 
(1995), p. 119, and Oyama (1985)(1992)). 
The belief that no element in the causal web is in any sense privileged rapidly leads 
to scepticism concerning these types of understanding or model that depict certain elements 
(be they in the genes or in the actual neural circuitry) as inner programs for the production 
of certain behaviors. In extreme cases this translates into scepticism concerning the very 
idea of internal representations9. More obviously, it translates into wariness concerning the 




descriptions, sets of instruments, etc., etc. (See e.g., Thelen & Smith (1994), p. Xix, 9, 33, 
83, 112; Elman et al. (1996), p. 350-352). 
Such negativity accrues an obligation. How else are we to comprehend the natural 
genesis of form and behavior? The general tendency, at this point, is to favor accounts that 
invoke multiple interaction biases and that depict form and behavior as emergent properties 
of the overall causal mesh. The case of genetic determination provides a nice example. For 
the image of the gene (or genes) as directly coding for specific morphological or behavioral 
outcomes is, it is universally accepted, a simplification (at best). Genes (as we will see in 
more detail in section 5) bring about their effects via an extended sequence of interactive 
processes. These may include local chemical interactions, basic physical laws governing 
the emergence of form (see, e.g., Goodwin=s (1995) work in "morphogenetic fields” and 
the complex interplay between development and environmental factors (e.g., the use of 
ambient temperature to determine the sex of Mississippi alligators -- Goodwin (1995), p. 
38, or the more complex and extended example of the chick imprinting mechanism). In 
such cases, the relation between the genes and the final product is mediated by multiple 
types and levels of interaction (see especially Elman et al. (1996), Ch.6). Such mediation, it 
is argued, works against the notion of the genes as codes, programs, algorithms, 
descriptions or prescriptions. Instead, we should think of genes as being more like 
"catalysts" (op.cit., p. 351), "seeds" (Goodwin (1995), p. 16) or “modifiers” (op.cit., p. 
144). In support of e.g., the "genes-as-catalysts-not-programs” view it is argued that: 
Programs are (more or less) informationally self-contained. Catalysts, on the other 
hand, are embedded in an environment of natural laws and processes 
Elman et al. (1996), p. 351. 
A catalyst, the authors note, is individually inert. Alone, it does nothing. But place it 
in a certain context (e.g., a vat of chemicals) and it can ensure an outcome that would 




reaction. The gene does not "define the conditions for reaction” -- that is left to the laws of 
biochemistry. Instead the genes "harness those laws by ensuring that critical components 
are present at the right time and then nudging the reaction forward” (both quotes: op.cit., p. 
351-352). 
Why not count the gene as, if not a full blueprint, at least a program: an algorithm for 
bringing about a certain effect? The reason given that programs (according to Elman et al.) 
are informationally self-contained: 
One can examine a program and -- looking only at the code -- make a reasonable 
guess about what it will do. This is not possible with genetic material. The 
relationship between DNA nase triples and amino acids may be direct; but the 
assembly of amino acids into proteins, the timing of when specific genes are 
expressed and the effect of a gene's products are highly context-sensitive 
Elman et al. (1996), p. 351. 
Genes, it is argued, are not informationally self-contained. Taken alone, their 
information content (like that of a catalyst) is zero (op.cit., p. 351). But taken in context, the 
information content explodes: it becomes "potentially enormous, embracing whatever 
information there is in the environment” (op.cit., p. 351). 
This discussion of the information content of some part of an extended causal process 
(in this case, the part is a gene: but that is not essential) is both problematic and revealing. 
For I believe it displays an important widespread confusion centered on the unreachable 
grail of informational self-containment. Unraveling this confusion is the task of section 4. 
For the present, however, notice how easily this kind of vision carries over to the more 
developmental cases rehearsed in the previous section. The neural system Conspec cannot, 
on its own, account for chick imprinting. But placed in the rich context of the effects of 
Conspec on whole organism behavior, the learning profile of IMHV and the natural, 




By extension, the genetic bases of Conspec function (via a further series of interactions) to 
ensure that this bias is present and hence -- via an extended sequence of environment-
exploiting interactions -- act to ensure successful imprinting (keeping all the other factors 
fixed). I show the "dependence on interactions is repeated at successively higher levels of 
organization” (op.cit., p. 351). 
Such dependence on interactions is also at the root of Thelen & Smith=s insistence 
that (in the stepping example described in section 2) there is 
no essence of locomotion either in the motor cortex on the spinal cord. Indeed, it 
would be equally credible to assign the essence of walking to the treadmill than to a 
neural structure... 
Thelen & Smith (1994), p. 17. 
Much in the spirit of Elman et al.'s notion of the gene as catalyst, Thelen & Smith argue 
that flexor tone (the relative tightness or give in the infant's legs) is acting as a >control 
parameter= that cuts so as to "engender the shift into stable alternate stepping” (op.cit., p. 
112). But importantly, 
as a control parameter, flexor tone constrained the interacting elements but did not 
prescribe the outcome in a privileged way 
Thelen & Smith (1994), p. 112. 
Finally, consider Elman et al.'s (1996) argument against the idea that innate 
knowledge underpins our capacities to rapidly learn about grammar, physics, other minds 
and so on. In briefest outline10, the argument is that nature looks to rely not on detailed pre-
specifications of "fine-grained patterns of cortical connectivity” (op.cit., p. 360) but on the 
provision of a variety of simpler biases involving architecture (neuron types, numbers of 
layers, connectivity between whole brain regions) and timing (waves of synaptic growth 
and loss, relative development of sensory systems, etc.). (See table 1.3, op.cit., p. 35). 




specific skills, forms and behaviors, including, for example, the robust acquisition of 
grammatical knowledge. We are thus innately predisposed to learn a grammar, but in a way 
that falls short (it is arguable of requiring the innate prespecification of actual grammatical 
knowledge. Instead, constraints at the levels of timing and architecture, in collaboration 
with environmental survival, inexorably nudge the system towards the target knowledge. In 
such a case, we are told, "the knowledge itself ... would not be innate and would require 
appropriate interactions to develop” (op.cit., p. 364). 
All these arguments and assertions demand attention in their own right. They all 
share in virtue of drawing our attention in the sheer complexity and heterogeneity of the 
causal webs that underlie various phenomena of scientific interest. And in specific claims 
and conclusions displayed all innate consideration of a host of pertinent issues, both for and 
against. In the context of the present project, however, I want to focus attention on just one 
common thread: the tendency to cite causal complexity and the important role of repeated 
interactions as a reason to eschew talk of specific states or items as prescribing, 
programming or coding for specific outcomes. Call this the ;inference to egalitarianism=. I 
believe this inference to be false, and for two fairly deep reasons. The reasons center first 
(section 4 following) on the problematic notions of self-containment and information-
content, and second (section 5 following) on the difference between invoking a cause and 
unpacking the workings of a complex system. 
4. The Myth of the Self-Contained Code 
The first reason to be wary (of the inference to egalitarianism) concerns the putative 
contrast between genuine programs (codes, recipes, etc.) And factors that bring about 
effects only in the context of a rich backdrop of the contributory processes and interactions. 
The contrast is explicit in Elman et al/ (1996, p. 351) characterization of programs as being 
A(more or less) informationally self-contained.”This claim, as far as I can see, is simply 




repository of all the information necessary to solve a problem. Think, for example, of a 
standard program written in a language such as LISP. LISP, as we all know, is a List 
Processing Language. That means you can do things such as store a list (say (abc)) then add 
new items using operators such as cons (concatenate). The input (cons d (abc)) adds d to 
the head of the list yielding (dabc). You can also use functions such as (first) and (rest) to 
remove items from lists12. 
The point to notice is just that the operation of these functions -- upon which the 
success of just about any LISP program depends -- is by no stretch of the imagination even 
>more or less= given as part of any actual program written in LISP. Instead, like the 
operating system firmware -- the function work due to the ecologically normal backdrop 
against which a LISP program brings about its effects. The program -- at least as we 
commonly use the term -- does not itself specify exactly how to bring about these effects. 
Instead, (to put it in the kind of terminology used for the cases examined earlier) it 
constitutes just one factor which -- in the special context of a computing device set up to 
compile or interpret such programs -- will reliably lead the overall system to discover a 
solution to the target problem. 
Ordinary computer programs are thus not informatically self-contained. So the fact 
that the genes (for example) do not contain all the information needed to describe a 
biological organism cannot (in and of itself) constitute a reason to reject talk of genes as 
programming for certain traits, behaviors or outcomes. Likewise, the fact that neural events 
are just one factor amongst many whose combined activity yields stepping behavior cannot 
(in and of itself) constitute a reason for rejecting the idea of motor programs. In each case, 
the factor invoked (genes or motor programs) may be regarded as coding for a specific 
outcome on the assumption that such ecologically normal backdrop prevails. 
This point is forcefully made by Dennett (1995) in a discussion of the complexities of 




of instructing the process of building a phenotypic body. For much of the necessary 
information is not given in the DNA itself but only in the combination of DNA and a set of 
environmental conditions. But, Dennett argues, even in the case of a library (universally 
accepted as being a storehouse of information) it is "really only libraries-plus-readers that 
preserve and store information” (op.cit., p. 197). Likewise DNA codes for organismic 
features only in the context of an environment capable of >reading= the DNA. The code 
can do its work only against a certain backdrop. To take a homely example: 
every time you make sure that your dishrag gets properly dry in between uses, you 
break the chain of environmental continuity (e.g., loss of moisture) that is part of the 
informational background presupposed by the DNA of the bacteria in the dishrag 
whose demise you seek 
Dennett (1995), p. 197. 
The DNA codes for specific outcomes only in a context that includes both reliable 
local chemical reactions and wider environmental contingencies (such as moisture). 
Without this extended reading system DNA sequences, Dennett notes, "don't specify 
anything at all.” Yet this rampant presumptiveness should not, he argues, prohibit us from 
speaking of e.g., genes for x. For the gene (or genes) may be "for x” in the simple sense 
that it is a feature whose presence or absence is a difference that makes a systematic 
(usually population level) difference to the presence (or absence) of x13. We will return to 
this point in section 5 below. 
What then, of the notion of informational self-containment itself? We are, I think, 
quite properly pulled in two directions. On the one hand, we might like to say that by 
keeping a certain ecological backdrop constant, we can legitimately speak of information 
about biological form being given in the DNA. This, after all, is no worse than supposing 
that the books in the library (keeping the human reader constant) contain information about 




contains the information needed to solve a given problem. On the other hand, we should not 
thereby be blinded to the large extent to which the finished product depends on a wider 
variety of other factors and forces. It is in this sense that, for example, the quantity of 
information encoded in the genome falls spectacularly short of what would be needed to 
describe the organism. These is, in short, a conflict between the simple, quantitative 
measures of information used in information theory and the effective information content 
that can be carried by a force or structure able to piggyback upon (or assume) a certain 
reading system or a certain context of effect. The apparent mismatch between quantitative 
information-theory and semantics is, of course, well-known. What is emerging here is the 
extent to which those mismatch may be rooted in the way some bearers of content (such as 
messages) trade on assumptions concerning contexts and readers. 
Cohen & Stewart (1994, p. 353) drive this home using a simple thought experiment. 
Suppose you are told that "If I don't phone you tonight, Aunt Gertie will be arriving on the 
4:10 train from Chattanooga. Take her home.” That evening, you receive no phone call. 
The null event (of your not receiving a call) "conveys a sizable quantity of information with 
a zero-bit message.” Maybe, the authors note, we really have a one-bit message here (one 
on/off choice). But the xxx is unaffected: a complex set of events is reliably set in motion 
by a sparse signal -- a signal that nonetheless effectively conveys a rich content. By 
contrast, a bare television screen caption that reads "call 1-800-666-7777" conveys an 
effective content comprising just 36 bits of information (11 decimal digits). Yet the 
information-theoretic measure of the television signal us very much higher, as such a signal 
must specify the activity of 100 lines each involving 1000 phosphate dots and capable of 
exhibiting these different colors. The signal this constitutes (from this perspective) an 
800,000 bit message -- see Cohen & Stewart (1994), p. 353. 
We are then lead to a contrast between (what I am calling) the "effective content” of a 




telephone message) is revealed as a thoroughly context-dependent phenomenon and one 
that depends on somehow "triggering” the access of information from a specific range of 
possibilities” (op.cit., p.353). Information about this range of possibilities lies not in the 
triggering signal but in the receiver, reader or the environment in which it has its effects. 
This we have now seen, is true not just of DNA14 and neural structures but of words in 
library books, standard LISP programs -- in fact, just about every case where we would 
standardly talk of one set of items as coding for something else. Cohen & Stewart sum it up 
well: 
the meaning in a language does not reside in the code...[it] stems from the existence 
of a shared context. For language, the context is the culture shared by those who 
speak that language. For the DNA message, the context is biological 
development...all messages in the real world that really are messages happen within a 
context. That context may be evolutionary, chemical, biological, neurological, 
linguistic or technological, but it transforms the question of information-content 
beyond measure... 
Cohen & Stewart (1994), p. 354-5. 
The observation that chemical factors and rich environmental interactions (etc.) Play 
a crucial role in bringing about certain effects thus cannot (in and of itself) constitute a 
good reason to reject the image of genes or inner neural structure as coding for, prescribing, 
or programming those effects. For rich context-dependence is always the rule, even in 
mundane and unproblematic uses of the notions of program, code and message. The 
putative contrast with a fully context-independent way of embodying meaning is 
misguided: the self-contained code is a myth. 
5. The Myth of Explanatory Symmetry 
The inference to egalitarianism has, however, a second string to its bow. For in 




as somehow special. For we want to say that x codes for y whereas the ecological backdrop 
provides the reading environment relative to which x bears its effective content. But 
whence this asymmetry? Could we not equally well depict the environmental factors as 
coding for y and the other factor (be it genetic or neural) as the backdrop against which 
these bear the effective contents they do? At which point the whole value of treating one 
type of factor as coding for or programming the outcome looks to be called into question. 
Why not just admit, in that case, that we confront a complex causal web whose combined 
activity yields the outcome, seek to understand as much as we can of the web itself and 
leave it at that? Such I think, is the thrust of Thelen & Smith's injunctions against 
"privileged elements” and of Elman et al.'s suggestion that we focus attention not on 
components but on the "complex web of interactions” (op.cit., p. 321). It is also the explicit 
moral of Oyama's influential (1985) work on the explanation of biological form, which 
claims that we must give up the practice of assigning priority to either internal or external 
forces and instead focus on the interactions themselves as primary objects of study. 
I must tread gently here, for I believe that there is something overwhelmingly right 
about these ideas and structures. If we want to understand how the outcome comes about, 
the proper explanatory strategy is indeed to confront the complex interactive process as a 
whole. In the course of such a confrontation we may sometimes discover that in terms of 
actual work done (measured as the degree of control exerted over the final product) the 
factors that I have been lumping together as the "ecological backdrop” in fact carry the bulk 
of the explanatory burden. This might be the case if, for example, the production of a 
certain biological form is heavily determined by basic laws of physics and chemistry and 
the genetic material simple "seeds” the process (see, e.g., Goodwin (1994) on 
morphogenesis, or Kauffman (1993)). 
But our explanatory attention is not always limited to the project of understanding 




about. And it is here that we may begin to break the apparent causal symmetry that would  
depict all factors on an essentially even footing. 
Thus consider a paradigmatic case of genetic disease: phenylketonuria15. This disease 
(known as PKU disease) causes mental retardation, shortness of stature and lack of pigment 
(see Gifford (1990), p. 333). Here is how it works: 
the normal gene at the PKU locus produces the liver enzyme phenylalanine 
hydroxylase, which is requires for the metabolism of the amino acid phenylalanine 
into tyrosine. Individuals homozygous for the PKU gene cannot produce this enzyme. 
If one=s diet contains the normal amount of phenylalanine, the serum level of 
phenylalanine rises dramatically. This interferes with the production of myelin, the 
protective sheath of nerve cells in the brain. But these effects are avoided if a diet low 
in phenylalanine is proved and this is what is done for therapy 
Gifford (1990), p. 333 (my emphasis). 
Gifford notes the interesting consequence: this is a disease which can be avoided or 
cured by a simple environmental manipulation. The disease is a joint effect of the abnormal 
gene and the diet. But PKU disease s classed as a paradigmatic case of a genetic problem. 
Why? Gifford's suggestion (one endorsed in various forms by both Dawkins (1982, p. 23) 
and Dennett (1995, p. 116)) is that we are thereby drawing attention to the fact that the diet 
is a common factor in the base population, whereas the PKU gene is not. Relative to the 
base population, it is the gene that makes the difference (Dennett (1995), p. 116), even 
though the workload (the causal etiology of the disease) is spread between genetic and 
environmental factors, and even though the outcome is this fully manipulable by non-
genetic means. Gifford this proposes that: 
(DF) A trait is genetic (with respect to population P) if it is genetic factors which 





The answer to the "why” question (why did that person develop PKU disease?) Thus 
isolates the genetic factors as especially relevant. But the answer to the "how” question 
(how does PKU disease arise) implicates genetic and environmental factors pretty well on 
even footing. 
The cost of this maneuver is clear enough. Change the normal environmental 
conditions and what was once a genetic disease becomes an environmentally induced 
problem. This is because the "why” question is always framed against a fixed background. 
Gifford thus noted (following Burian (1981)) that in the hypothetical case of a population 
whose normal diet (unlike our own) is low in phenylalanine, the very same causal story 
would be classed as a case of environmentally induced disease. For the locus of relevant 
plasticity (as I shall say) here lies not in the genes but in the diet: it would be those (rare) 
individuals who are both homozygous for the PKU gene and consume high amounts of 
phenylalanine that fall ill, whilst the genetic factors alone (being homozygous for the PKU 
gene) would not normally lead -- in that population -- to the development of the disease. 
What counts as genetic this depends "not only on the causal processes in the individual, but 
also on a fact external to this: the causal factors shared in the population” (Gifford (1994), 
p. 334). Such relativity to a contextual baseline is, however, exactly what we should expect 
given our earlier discussion of the close relation between effective content and an assumed 
ecological backdrop. The context-relativity in no way impurges the correctness (relative to 
the actual population and environment) of singling out the PKU gene as especially relevant 
in the production of the disease. What we must not do, of course, is allow this fact to blind 
us to the full causal picture and hence to the full causal picture and hence to the possibility 
of an environmental cure for the disease itself. 
Explanatory priority (in a given context) is thus turns not on what factor (if any) does 
the greatest amount of actual work but in where we should look for the differences that 




not. This is the natural explanatory concomitant of the idea (section 4 above) of detailed 
effective contents being conveyed by simple (but context-exploiting) physical transactions. 
In the genetic case, we can take this a step further by noticing that genetic material is 
naturally designed to function as a primary locus of plasticity -- it is the natural function of 
the genetic material to be the kind of difference that (relative to an assumed ecological 
backdrop) makes a specific organism-level difference. In this vein Sterelny (1995) argues 
that the genome represents developmental outcomes because it is its evolved function to 
bring about those outcomes. The fact that this bringing about involves multiple gene-
environment interacting does not undermine the description of the genome as a 
representation because "representation depends not on correlation but function” (op.cit., p. 
165). The correlations may be messy and indirect. But the function shines through, and is 
the source of the explanatory asymmetry between genome and environment. Both factors 
correlate equally with developmental outcomes, but they play asymmetric roles. For 
example; 
snow guns have a different growth pattern in environments in which they are exposed 
to wind and snow. Both the triggering environmental and the snow gum genome are 
necessary for the guns response to climatic adversity. But one element of the 
developmental matrix -- the genome -- exists only because of its role in the 
production of the plant phenotype. That is why it has the function of producing that 
phenotype and hence why it represents that phenotype. So an informational idea of a 
replicate can preserved 
Sterelny (1995), p. 165. 
The extension of the line on explanatory priority to the case of neural codes and 
programs is immediate. Here too we should say that a neural structure or process x codes 
for a behavioral outcome y, if against a normal ecological backdrop, it is the difference that 




behavior (say, reaching out an arm) even if the outcome depends equally upon a variety of 
bodily and environmental factors such as the force of gravity and the spring-like qualities 
of arm muscles. For such factors are the ecologically normal backdrop against which the 
neural state was selected to bring about its effects17. 
Notice, finally that this criterion does not simply beg the question in favor of inner or 
genetic states. Instead, it invites us to keep constant the stabilities and features of the 
normal ecological backdrop and to focus attention (for the purposes of answering the why 
question) on the locus of plasticity: the place to which differences in the outcome (in the 
normal context) are best referred. As bare biological brains increasingly parasitize and 
exploit the environment as a kind of extended information-processing resource18, the 
location of this primary explanatory locus may sometimes tend to shift outwards. Such 
complexities, however, are best left for another occasion19. 
The observation that the real workload involved in bringing about some effect may be 
evenly spread between allegedly "privileged” factors (such as genes and neural events) and 
other influence (environmental, chemical, bodily) cannot, I conclude, in and of itself, 
constitute a good reason to reject the practice of treating certain factors as special: as 
coding for, programming, or prescribing the outcome in question. It cannot do so because 
the relevant asymmetry lies not in the causal chain itself but in the extent to which 
difference in respect of that outcome within a baseline population and ecological setting 
may be traced to difference in the privileged item. If our goal is to explain those observed 
differences, we may properly single out a few threads in the complex causal weave. If our 
project is to understand exactly how the outcome is produced, we may attend instead to the 
full intricacies of the woven whole20. 
6. Conclusion: Living in Complexity 
Life is terrifyingly complex. Things interrelate in deep and often desperately 




in making things happen. When we do so, it is not because we are the self-contained 
repository of the desired outcome. Nor is it (usually) because we command a detailed 
description of how to manipulate all the causal chains that link us to our goal. Instead, it is 
because our strategies have been learned and tuned against a backdrop of culture and 
physical and social laws and practices. Our strategies take this complex backdrop for 
granted and manipulate the flow of events by piggybacking upon these unremarked 
currents in the causal nexus. 
In this one respect, at least, life, words, programs and genes are all fellow travelers. 
They all bring about their effects by working within a complex and extended causal fabric. 
It is the distinctive virtue of much recent work in biology, anthropology, and cognitive 
science21 to begin to recognize the extent and impact of this causal complexity and 
heterogeneity. Such recognition, however, should not be seen as a threat to explanatory 
strategies that invoke notions such as coding for, programming, or prescribing specific 
behavioral or morphological outcomes. The illusion of such a threat is, I have argued, 
linked to the explicit or tactic endorsement of two (interrelated) myths. The first s the myth 
of the self-contained code: the belief that to really code for (or program, or prescribe) an 
outcome an entity must contain, within itself, a detailed description of the outcome. This 
myth is flatly incompatible with any normal use of the notions of program, code and 
message. The second is the myth of explanatory symmetry: the belief that the practice of 
treating certain causal threads using the special terms of codes, programs, and contents 
cannot be justified if the actual workload is evenly spread between a wide variety of factors 
and forces. This belief fails, however, to allow for the fact that our explanation-giving 
practice often involve not the simple measurement of causal work but the (context-and-
backdrop relative) assessment of the locus of differentiation. We judge, that is, that 
observed differences are best explained by keeping a certain background fixed22 and asking 




at one level (the level of work done) may thus co-exist with genuine asymmetry at another 
level (the level of greatest relevant plasticity). Teleological approaches (such as Sterelny's 
story about the snow gum) add a further consideration viz, that nay privileged locus play 
the special functional role of existing so s to bring about its characteristics effects. The 
point, in both cases, is that causal equality need not imply explanatory symmetry. 
Puncturing the twin myths blocks any direct23 inference from facts about causal 
complexity to the rejection of notions such as inner codes, programs, instruction or 
prescriptions. It also casts doubt on arguments against innate knowledge24 that depend on 
contrasting highly interaction-dependent phenomena with self-contained storehouses of 
domain-specific information. For it suggests that the basic notion of a state=s bearing a 
specific effective content is fully compatible with the need to place the state in a rich 
ecologically context: a context that acts as the assumed backdrop of the original encoding. 
The same point, substituting :internal representation” for "innate knowledge,” can be made 
against recent attempts to stress organism-environment interactions in (apparent) 
opposition to reliance on internal represetnations25. 
Moving even further a field, the present treatment may perhaps suggest a somewhat 
conciliatory angle on the interalism/externalism debate in the philosophy of mind26. For a 
purely inner state may be said to bear a certain effective content, even thought the actual 
causal chain which determines what that content is now extends far outside the agent=s 
head. The content is thus referred to the inner state, but its true physical vehicle involves a 
wide range of additional environmental structures and circumstances. The question of 
where to locate the "supervenient base” for the content thus admits no straightforward 
answer. The correct diagnosis is just that the inner state itself bears the effective content but 
in a way that cannot help but assume an extended ecological backdrop27. 
There is much that remains unclear and problematic in all these debates and I do not 




enterprise is perhaps this: that it underlines just how badly we still understand the 
apparently foundational notion of the information-content of a physical state and how very 
hard it is to take ecological context as seriously as we surely must. Yet it is in the balance 
of these slippery factors that mind finds its place in the natural world. Like cheap 





1.  See Oyama (1985), Johnston (1988), Gifford (1990), Bray (1992), and Goodwin (1995). 
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Elman et al.=s (1996) account of innateness, work in dynamical systems theory (Kelso 
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Steels (1994), Maes (1994), Resnick (1994), and essays in Boden (1996)). 
3.  Especially Arthur (1990) -- see also Clark (1997a). 
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(1991), essays in Griffiths (1992), van Gelder (1995), van Gelder & Port (1995), Sterelny 
(1995), Dennett (1995), Ch. 5 & 8, Godfrey-Smith (1996) and Clark (1997b). 
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Port (1995) and Clark (1997b). 
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Conspec -- see Horn (1985), Elman et al. (1996), p. 326. 
8.  Clark (to appear). 
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Cohen & Stewart (op.cit.), p. 354. 
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Clark (1997b). 
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